Gerard King
https://www.canada.gerardking.dev
September 23, 2025
G7 vs. G7 Human Hierarchy of Needs: Strategic Supply Chains and Controllers in National Security
Abstract
The Group of Seven (G7) countries represent the core of advanced industrialized economies whose global influence is deeply entwined with the control and resilience of their supply chains. This paper examines the intricate relationship between the human hierarchy of needs within G7 populations and the strategic supply chains that satisfy those needs, emphasizing how controllers within and between G7 nations exert influence, power, and competition. Using Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs as a theoretical framework, the study explores how supply chain vulnerabilities at each level of human need—ranging from physiological essentials to self-actualization—pose national security risks and opportunities for strategic control. The research further analyzes how this dynamic interplays with political, economic, and military power, affecting alliance stability and geopolitical competition within the G7. The implications for Canadian National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) are profound, requiring nuanced strategies to safeguard supply chain integrity and population resilience.
Introduction
The G7 countries—Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States—operate within a complex global ecosystem where their power and stability are not only determined by traditional military might but also by their ability to control and secure supply chains that sustain their populations (Anderson & Markides, 2019). Central to this challenge is understanding how the human hierarchy of needs, as articulated by Maslow (1943), shapes demand patterns and vulnerabilities across multiple levels of society. From food and energy (physiological needs) to security, social belonging, esteem, and ultimately self-actualization, the capacity to ensure uninterrupted supply has emerged as a frontline issue in national defense and geopolitical competition (Khan et al., 2021).
This paper explores the G7’s internal competition and cooperation through the prism of supply chain control linked to human needs. It investigates who the key controllers are—ranging from government agencies and multinational corporations to informal networks—and how supply chain resilience or disruption affects not only economic outcomes but also societal stability and alliance dynamics. The study provides actionable insights for Canada’s DND and CAF as they navigate this evolving landscape.
Theoretical Framework: Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs and National Security
Maslow’s (1943) hierarchy, which ranks human needs from basic physiological necessities to the pinnacle of self-actualization, provides a valuable conceptual lens to analyze how supply chains underpin societal stability:
Physiological Needs: Food, water, shelter, energy
Safety Needs: Physical security, health, economic security
Love and Belongingness: Social connections, community support
Esteem Needs: Recognition, status, autonomy
Self-Actualization: Fulfillment, creativity, innovation
Supply chains operate as the arteries delivering resources that meet these needs. When these chains are threatened or manipulated, the risk of social unrest, political instability, and weakened national defense capacity rises dramatically (Ivanov, 2020).
Strategic Importance of Supply Chains in the G7
Physiological Needs: Food, Water, and Energy Security
Food and energy supply chains have become critical vectors for geopolitical leverage among G7 nations. The COVID-19 pandemic and recent geopolitical conflicts demonstrated how fragile and interdependent these systems are (Gereffi, 2020).
Food Security: G7 countries rely heavily on complex, multinational agribusiness supply chains. Disruptions caused by trade restrictions or climate change directly affect domestic stability (Hendrix & Brinkman, 2019).
Energy Supply: Control over energy—oil, natural gas, and emerging renewables—is central to national power. The G7’s strategic energy reserves and alliances are pivotal in securing physiological survival and economic functioning (Jansen & Soderholm, 2022).
Safety Needs: Cybersecurity and Health Systems
The digitalization of supply chains has introduced new vulnerabilities. Cyberattacks targeting supply chain management systems can cripple critical infrastructure, impacting health, transport, and military readiness (Boyes, 2018).
Healthcare supply chains—especially post-pandemic—are vital to national resilience. Disruptions to pharmaceutical manufacturing or vaccine distribution have immediate consequences for safety and societal trust (Kendall et al., 2021).
Social and Esteem Needs: Social Media and Information Flows
Beyond physical goods, social belonging and esteem depend increasingly on the flow of digital information. G7 nations face internal and external competition over control of data pipelines and narrative construction (Miskimmon et al., 2017).
Corporations and state actors controlling social media platforms influence social cohesion and political stability by shaping access to information, moderating discourse, and conducting covert psychological operations (Rid, 2020).
Self-Actualization: Innovation Ecosystems and Knowledge Supply Chains
At the highest level, innovation ecosystems supply the human desire for creativity, achievement, and growth. Control over technology, research collaboration, and intellectual property creates asymmetries of power within the G7 and against external competitors (West, 2019).
Controllers of Supply Chains: Actors and Mechanisms
Supply chain controllers in the G7 include:
Governments and Intelligence Agencies: Enforce regulations, conduct strategic stockpiling, and engage in covert operations to influence or disrupt rival supply chains (Department of National Defence, 2023).
Multinational Corporations: Own critical infrastructure and resources; their decisions affect availability and prices of essential goods (Gereffi, 2020).
Financial Institutions and Trade Organizations: Control liquidity and sanctions that shape the flow of goods and services (Elliott, 2022).
Informal Networks and Criminal Organizations: Exploit supply chain vulnerabilities for illicit gains, sometimes intersecting with state-sponsored activities (Kleemans & de Poot, 2008).
The interplay among these actors creates a layered and often opaque control architecture, complicating efforts to predict or mitigate disruptions.
Intra-G7 Competition and Cooperation
Competition
Although the G7 is an alliance, member states often engage in covert competition for supply chain dominance, especially in emerging technologies and critical materials (Friedman, 2021). The U.S.-China tech rivalry reverberates within G7 markets, with countries vying for leadership in 5G, AI, and semiconductors (Wang et al., 2022).
Trade wars and export controls illustrate how economic instruments serve as supply chain levers, influencing access to vital components and technologies (Evenett, 2020).
Cooperation
Despite competition, G7 nations have mechanisms for collaboration:
Joint stockpiling agreements for strategic resources (Department of National Defence, 2023).
Coordinated responses to supply chain crises, such as pandemic medical supplies (Kendall et al., 2021).
Shared cybersecurity frameworks protecting digital supply chains (Boyes, 2018).
Effective cooperation requires trust and transparency, challenged by the simultaneous reality of competition.
Implications for Canadian National Defence
Canada’s position in the G7 brings unique vulnerabilities and opportunities:
Supply Chain Resilience: The DND must ensure that critical supply chains—especially for food, energy, and defense materiel—are diversified and protected against both kinetic and cyber threats (Canadian Armed Forces, 2024).
Intelligence and Monitoring: Enhancing surveillance of supply chain activities within the alliance is necessary to detect manipulative tactics by allies or adversaries (CSIS, 2023).
Alliance Management: Canada should advocate for greater transparency and cooperation within G7 frameworks to balance competition and collective security (Pentland & Waterman, 2022).
Civil-Military Integration: Leveraging civilian logistics and private sector partnerships strengthens Canada’s capacity to respond to supply chain crises (Ivanov, 2020).
Conclusion
The G7’s internal dynamics around human hierarchy of needs, supply chains, and controllers represent a sophisticated and high-stakes domain of national security. The interplay of cooperation and competition shapes the resilience of these advanced economies and their societal stability. For Canada’s DND and CAF, understanding and influencing these factors is paramount to safeguarding national interests in an increasingly interconnected and contested world.
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